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Abstract: In cooperative settings the success of the team is interlinked with the performance
of the individual members. Thus, the possibility to address problems and mistakes of team
members needs to be given. A common means in human-human interaction is the attribution
of blame. Yet, it is not clear how blame attributions affect cooperation between humans and
intelligent virtual agents and the overall perception of the agent. In order to take a first step
in answering these questions, a study on cooperative human-agent interaction was conducted.
The study was designed to investigate the effects of two different blaming strategies used by the
agent in response to an alleged goal achievement failure, that is, self-blame (agent blames itself)
followed by an apology versus other-blame (agent blames the user). The results indicate that
the combination of blame and trust repair enables a successful continuation of the cooperation
without loss of trust and likeability.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Over the years the nature of human-computer interaction
changed from using the machines as mere tools to view-
ing them as potential team mates in cooperative settings
(Bradshaw et al., 2012; Nass et al., 1996). People already
interact with human-like virtual agents similarly to how
they would with other humans (see Kra¨mer et al., 2015,
for an overview). Therefore, not only humans, but also
intelligent computer agents should be endowed with means
to address problems and mistakes in cooperative settings.
In human-human interaction a common and effective way
to achieve this is blame. Blame attributions provide the
opportunity to regulate behaviour, identify problems, and
help fixing them (Malle et al., 2014; Groom et al., 2010).
Identifying under which conditions humans accept blame
attributions from a computer agent and trust the agent’s
judgement is crucial. Research in human-robot interaction
already addressed the topic of blame and identified disad-
vantages, e. g. the decrease of trust (Groom et al., 2010;
Kaniarasu and Steinfeld, 2014). Therefore, one key aspect
for attributing blame in human-computer cooperation is
that trust in an agent is repaired successfully after a blame
judgement. However, it is not clear if blame affects human-
agent interaction in the same way as it affects human-robot
interaction and how trust can be repaired successfully. In
this paper we take a first step in investigating the effects
of blame and trust repair in human-agent interaction in a
specific cooperative setting. In particular, by conducting
a human-agent cooperation study, a first attempt is made
to examine under which circumstances the advantages of
blame can be applied appropriately such that the cooper-
ation can continue without loss of trust and acceptance.
We begin with reviewing the theoretical background and
related work on blame, trust and trust repair in section
2. In section 3 we give an overview of our approach
by describing the used framework and a pre-study. In
section 4 we then present results from the human-agent
cooperation study, which are subsequently discussed in
section 5.
2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In a cooperative game, where “a team member’s outcome
is tied to the outcome of the entire team” (Nass et al., 1996,
671), people get a feeling of affiliation regardless whether
the members of the team are humans or computers. Recent
evidence also shows that humans and machines are able
to work together in various settings and that cooperation
is an important ability of intelligent systems (Bradshaw
et al., 2012). The concept of blame is not new to human-
machine interaction. Moon (2003), for example, found
that people often assign responsibility according to the
self-serving bias when interacting with computers. This
bias denotes the tendency to claim credit for a success
and blame the partner for a failure. So far, however, the
use of blame in human-agent cooperation has not been
investigated.
2.1 Blame
Malle et al. (2014) define blame as a form of public crit-
icism which can only be directed at a person, relies on
social cognition and always demands warrant. This strict
definition makes it possible to distinguish between blame
and wrongness judgements, anger and event evaluations.
Wrongness judgements target an intentional behaviour,
event evaluations an event and anger can be directed at
anything. All three do not require warrant. Moreover, in
comparison to anger, blame is not an emotion people can
feel and directly express. It is a form of responsibility
assignment which requires information processing. The
purpose of blaming is the regulation of social behaviour. It
is a powerful but also dangerous means of communication
(Malle et al., 2014). Hence, the blamer needs to carefully
consider how he or she approaches the target of blame.
This can be difficult whenever the accompanying emo-
tions are strong and overwhelming. Yelling or personally
attacking the interlocutor would not be helpful, whereas
“people welcome thoughtful, clear, and constructive crit-
icism” (Voiklis et al., 2014, 1701). Blaming can be seen
as an invitation to communicate. When the invitation is
accepted, both sides can explain themselves, the relation-
ship can be repaired, and the blamer has the possibility to
persuade the norm violator to change his or her behaviour
(Malle et al., 2014). Accordingly, if blame is attributed
in a thoughtful way, it is a useful means to communicate
problems and to regulate behaviour.
The emotion accompanying blame does not only depend
on whether we blame ourselves or another person. It also
depends on the controllability or intentionality of the be-
haviour in question. When we blame another person we
most likely feel anger or pity: Anger when we perceive
the behaviour as intentional or controllable and pity when
we judge the behaviour as unintentional or uncontrollable
(Sander and Scherer, 2009). Similarly, we most probably
feel guilty when we intentionally commit or omit to do
something, whereas we feel ashamed when the negative
outcome was not controllable. Hence, the expression of
blame varies, as blame can be accompanied by different
emotions, e. g. anger, pity, guilt, and shame. In this exper-
iment the focus lies on intentional or controllable blame
and therefore the expressions of guilt and anger will be
looked at in more detail.
Whereas anger is a distinct facial expression, guilt is
not (Keltner and Buswell, 1996). Guilt, as well as the
emotion of regret, appear when one is responsible for a
negative outcome that affects others and not only oneself
(Zeelenberg and Breugelmans, 2008). However, Keltner
and Buswell (1996) propose that people communicate guilt
in a different way than just with their face. Likewise, anger
is not exclusively associated with blame and therefore
insufficient to communicate blame alone. Thus, for this
experiment the facial expressions of anger for other-blame
and regret for self-blame are used in connection with the
verbal expression of blame.
At this point, we are not aware of any research on the
effects of blame attribution in human-agent interaction,
but studies investigating this topic in human-robot inter-
action already exist. Groom et al. (2010) and Kaniarasu
and Steinfeld (2014), for example, examined the effects
of three different types of blame attributions by robots:
self-, other- and team-blame. Their results demonstrated
that humans prefer self-blame over other-blame in robots
and even like the self-blaming robot better than the team-
blaming robot. Other-blame only showed negative effects
on the perception of the robot’s abilities and the feeling
of team affiliation. Additionally, participants in the other-
blame condition perceived the robot as less competent.
Regarding their results on trust, there was no significant
difference between the types of attributions. Accordingly,
blame lowers trust, either because of the users’ annoyance
of the robot that blames them or because the users per-
ceive a constantly apologising robot as not trustworthy
(Kaniarasu and Steinfeld, 2014).
2.2 Trust Violations and Trust Repair
Lee and See (2004) define trust as the expectation of an
agent (the trustor) that another agent (the trustee) will
help to achieve the trustor’s goals in an uncertain and vul-
nerable situation. Trust violations occur when the trustee
does not fulfil the expectation of the trustor. Typically,
trust violations lead to three emotions: anger, disappoint-
ment, and “regret over having trusted in the first place”
(Martinez and Zeelenberg, 2015, 119). In an experiment
Martinez and Zeelenberg (2015) found contrasting effects
of these emotions: While anger and regret decrease trust
and trustworthiness, disappointment increases them. But
trust is not only affected by the feelings of the trustor,
it is also influenced by the feelings of the trustee. When
the trustee feels responsible for the harm done to the
trustor, he or she blames him- or herself. Hence, feelings
of regret and guilt accompanying self-blame (Kim et al.,
2006) decrease trust. Furthermore, they could lead to a
confession or an apology in order to make up for the
misbehaviour (Keltner and Buswell, 1996) and repair the
relationship. Kim et al. (2006) found evidence of positive
effects of different types of apologies after trust violations
that are competence- or integrity-based. Successful trust
repair after integrity-based trust violations is achieved by
apologising with an external attribution rather than an
internal. Consequently, the trust-repairing agent needs to
apologise for the misbehaviour, assure that it will not hap-
pen again, and partly take responsibility, yet also attribute
blame to an external influence, for example to another
agent. In comparison, internal attributions are more effec-
tive after competence-based trust violations. Accordingly,
trust is repaired more successfully if the violator takes
full responsibility and apologises for what happened. In
addition to the implications of apologies for human-human
interaction, a study by de Visser et al. (2016) demonstrates
that anthropomorphism enhances the effect of a trust-
repairing apology of a computer agent in cooperation.
To summarise, blame emerges when a person is found
responsible for a negative event or a norm-violating action
and there is reason to believe that he or she acted inten-
tionally or had the obligation and capacity to prevent the
outcome (Malle et al., 2014). Furthermore, the attribution
of blame and accompanying emotions can have a positive
or negative effect on trust and trustworthiness (Kaniarasu
and Steinfeld, 2014; Martinez and Zeelenberg, 2015). In
case of negative consequences, possibilities to repair trust
lie in the form of the apology (Kim et al., 2006). The state
of the art demonstrates that human-computer interaction
and especially interaction between humans and human-like
virtual agents can be social and similar to human-human
interaction (Lee and Nass, 2010). Studies focusing on
human-robot interaction reveal that self-blame is preferred
over other-blame, but all blaming strategies decrease trust
(Groom et al., 2010; Kaniarasu and Steinfeld, 2014). Yet, it
is not clear how attributions of blame and trust-repairing
apologies affect human-agent cooperation.
3. OVERVIEW OF APPROACH
3.1 Interaction Framework
The cooperative puzzle game was implemented with the
MultiPro prototyping framework (Mattar et al., 2015). In
the game two players — a human player and the virtual
agent — try to attain a joint goal interactively. The puzzle
game is inspired by Tetris, but includes some modifications
in order to facilitate controllability over the interaction
and enable the computer to take part in the game as
an autonomous player. There are two different types of
blocks, a U-shaped (U-block) and a T-shaped block (T-
block). Furthermore, blocks do not fall down gradually,
but can be moved horizontally and rotated in 90 degree
units at the top of the game board, before they are placed
in the puzzle field. The players take turns at placing blocks,
thereby trying to fill complete horizontal lines. Filled lines
are counted, but not cleared as in Tetris. The joint goal
is presented prior to the beginning of the game. In the
present study the joint goal is to reach a top 10 list
by filling more complete horizontal lines as the previous
players. Thereby, the outcome of one player depends on the
outcome of the entire team, which may result in a feeling
of team affiliation (Nass et al., 1996). The block-placing
algorithm used by the agent tests all possible options
and searches for the best next move based on different
criteria, e. g. whether a line can be filled with this move.
The algorithm was slightly adjusted for this experiment,
in the form that only the U-block was considered for the
next move of the agent instead of both blocks. Due to the
agent’s frequent use of the U-block, filling lines became
somewhat difficult and a tendency to fail was already
evident during the game. Moreover, the top 10 list was
designed such that all participants failed to reach the joint
goal. In this setting, the agent is given more control as it
always makes the first move and places the U-block in the
puzzle field. Thereafter, the human partner can only take
the remaining block and is therefore not given the chance
to choose a block. This gives the human partner warrant
to blame the agent for a failure in the game. Once the
last possible block has been moved into the puzzle field,
the round ends and the players get to know whether the
goal was attained. The virtual agent is positioned on the
right of the puzzle field. In the experiment the agent was
referred to as Sam. Figure 1 shows the interface and the
agent.
3.2 Pre-Study
A pre-study was conducted (N = 29) to examine the
assignment of responsibility by the human after (not) at-
taining the joint goal. The agent only showed eye blinking
and breathing behaviour and did not interact or communi-
cate with the participants in any way. The results showed
a strong tendency to affiliate with the team: 76% of all
participants assigned responsibility to both players instead
of themselves or the agent (see Figure 2).
In order to investigate if this changes when the agent
actively blames itself or the partner after not attaining the
Fig. 1. The game interface with the virtual agent Sam. The
next block can be modified in the block field (top) and
placed into the puzzle field (bottom).
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Fig. 2. Responsibility attributions (pre-study).
joint goal, a self-blaming agent versus an agent blaming
the human partner were used in the main study, which is
described in detail in section 4. As ratings of the agent’s
perceived competence did not differ significantly between
the two conditions in the pre-study, it was assumed that
participants did not believe the agent brought about the
failure due to a lack of competence. Hence, we expected
a possible trust violation in the main experiment not
to be competence-, but rather integrity-based. With this
in mind, successful trust repair after an integrity-based
trust violation is achieved by apologising with an external
attribution (Kim et al., 2006).
4. EXPERIMENT
In a laboratory experiment participants played a coopera-
tive puzzle game with a virtual agent. The study employed
a between-subject design manipulating the blaming strate-
gies used by the agent after not attaining the joint goal:
self-blame followed by a trust-repairing apology (SB con-
dition) and other-blame (OB condition). The effects of the
two strategies on the likeability, perceived competence of,
and trust in the agent were assessed. It was expected that
the two blaming strategies affect the overall perception of
the agent differently.
4.1 Participants
Thirty-six participants (20 males and 16 females) between
the age of 20 and 34 took part in the study (Mage = 23.86,
SDage = 2.81). The majority of them were students
from Bielefeld University of different study programmes.
The participants’ experience with the original Tetris game
ranged from “non at all” to “much” (Mtetris = 3.33,
SDtetris = 1.12, evaluated on a five-point Likert scale).
The study lasted approximately 30 minutes and the partic-
ipants took part in exchange for chocolate. Subjects were
randomly assigned to the two test groups.
4.2 Procedure
Participants were informed that they took part in an
experiment on natural human behaviour in an interac-
tive puzzle game. They were also informed that the sec-
ond player was controlled by a computer. Participants
were asked to sign a consent form and to fill out a pre-
questionnaire that covered personal information like age,
gender and an estimation of their experience with the
game Tetris. Next, participants received the puzzle game
instructions containing a description of the course of the
game and the keyboard controls needed to move, rotate
and place the blocks. Then, participants played an in-
troductory round without the virtual agent to familiarise
themselves with the controls and the game interface. Be-
fore the interaction with the agent began, the joint goal:
“Manage to reach the top 10 list together by filling more
lines!” and the top 10 list containing the names of players
and the numbers of filled lines they reached in the game
were presented on screen. Afterwards, one round of the
game was played together with the agent. Once the game
ended, the participants saw their result. In order to evalu-
ate the participants’ trust in the agent after the game, they
played one round of the Give-Some Dilemma described
in section 4.3. Subsequently, participants evaluated the
interaction with the virtual agent in a post-questionnaire.
Upon completing the questionnaire, participants were fully
debriefed and received chocolate as a reward for their
participation.
4.3 Material
Cooperative Puzzle Game. The game as described in
section 3.1 was used and the behaviour of the virtual agent
was manipulated. In each of the two conditions the virtual
agent Sam reacted at the beginning of the round, after
moves five and seven — either after its own move (SB) or
after the team partner’s move (OB) — as well as at the
end of the round after the message “You did not reach
the top 10 list!” was shown. Sam’s introductory sentence
and behaviour did not differ in the two conditions. Here,
Sam smiled a little while saying “Hi, I am Sam. I will
place the first block now!”. The introductory sentence was
included in order to inform participants that the agent
would communicate with them in the further course of the
game and to make the interaction seem more natural. To
increase the effect of the blame judgements and to achieve
more naturalness in the interaction, the agent reacted
twice during the round and once at the end. In the SB
condition Sam shook its head and said “What am I doing?”
after its fifth move and looked sad and a bit regretful after
its seventh move (see Figure 3) while saying “That way we
will not achieve the goal!”.
Fig. 3. The agent’s facial expressions in the SB condition.
Left: looking sad and somewhat regretful. Right:
showing regret.
At the end of the round the agent tried to repair trust
with an external apology. Hence, it apologised, blamed
itself partly, while also attributing blame to a virus and
stating that it will not happen again. In the game this was
implemented by letting Sam show regret (see Figure 3)
while saying: “Oh no. Now I am somehow responsible for
our failure! I was not able to concentrate today because
I have caught a virus. I am sorry! That will not happen
again!”.
Similarly, in the OB condition the agent shook its head
and said: “What are you doing?” after the subject’s fifth
move and looked a bit angry after the subject’s seventh
move (see Figure 4) while saying: “That way we will not
achieve the goal!”. At the end of the round Sam showed
anger (see Figure 4) and said: “Now it is your fault that
we lost! If you had placed the blocks differently, we would
have played better together!”.
Fig. 4. The agent’s facial expressions in the OB condition.
Left: looking somewhat angry. Right: showing anger.
Trust Measure. Trust in the agent was evaluated us-
ing the Give-Some Dilemma (GSD), a two-player social
dilemma between the participant and the computer agent.
In this dilemma both players receive four coins. Their task
is to decide how many coins they want to exchange to their
partner. Importantly, the value of coins being exchanged
is doubled, whereas the value of coins that are kept stays
the same. As they make this decision simultaneously, there
is no possibility to agree on a strategy. The individual
payoff is maximized by receiving and keeping all coins,
whereas the collective payoff is maximized by both players
exchanging all coins, hence the dilemma. The dilemma
provides an incremental measure of behavioural trust, op-
erationalised as the number of tokens being exchanged. In-
stead of measuring pure economic decision-making, choices
in the dilemma reflect social perceptions of the counterpart
and were shown to correlate positively with subjective
trust assessments (Lee et al., 2013). To illustrate how the
game works an example round and a payoff matrix were
printed on a sheet for the participants. A one-shot version
of the dilemma was played, so that participants needed to
make their decisions based solely on their perception of
Sam after the puzzle game. The dilemma was included in
the game interface to create the impression of an ongoing
interaction with Sam, as the agent did not actually take
part in the game.
Post-Questionnaire. Participants were asked to evaluate
their interaction with Sam in the puzzle game on multiple
scales. First, participants were asked to rate their emo-
tional reaction, using the following items (Rilling et al.,
2008): jealousy, guilt, betrayal, indignation, anger, con-
tempt, disappointment, envy, happiness, sadness, relief,
annoyance, camaraderie, trust, and shame (5-point Likert
scale). The same items were used to examine what partic-
ipants thought Sam felt after the game to assess how well
the intentions were conveyed by the facial expressions. A
manipulation check assessed participants’ understanding
of the responsibility assignment: ”Who did Sam blame
for the result?” (answer options: “Sam”, “me” or “us
both equally”). To investigate responsibility attributions,
participants answered the question “According to your
opinion, who is responsible for the outcome?” (answer
options: “Sam”, “me” or “us both equally”). The question
“According to your opinion, how much did Sam try to
achieve the joint goal?” assessed the agent’s perceived
cooperativeness (5-point Likert). The overall experience in
the game was evaluated by asking “How much would you
like to play again with Sam?” (5-point Likert). Moreover,
we measured Sam’s perceived competence and trustwor-
thiness. We adopted items proposed by Fogg and Tseng
(1999) to measure computer credibility (5-point Likert).
The competence items were “knowledgeable”, “compe-
tent”, “intelligent”, “capable”, “experienced” and “power-
ful” (Cronbach’s α = .93); The trustworthiness items were
“good”, “well-intentioned”, “honest”, “truthful”, “trust-
worthy” and “unbiased” (Cronbach’s α = .86). As trust-
worthiness is a factor of likeability (cf. Fiske et al., 2007),
the overall experience and the perceived trustworthiness
indicated how much participants liked the virtual agent.
Finally, an open question provided the possibility to de-
scribe Sam in one’s own words.
4.4 Hypotheses
Since there is no comparable research in human-agent
interaction and previous studies suggest that humans may
behave in the same way with robots as with virtual agents
(Lee and Nass, 2010), it is assumed to observe the same
results as Kaniarasu and Steinfeld (2014) and Groom
et al. (2010) in their experiments on blame attribution in
human-robot interaction. Hence, we assume that partici-
pants prefer the self-blaming agent over the agent blaming
its partner, resulting in higher likeability and competence
ratings of the self-blaming agent. As other-blame had a
negative effect on team affiliation, we expect that the
assignment of responsibility differs significantly between
the conditions. Since the self-blaming agent tries to repair
trust at the end of the game according to the findings of
Kim et al. (2006), we hypothesise that trust in the other-
blaming agent is lower than in the self-blaming agent due
to the trust-repairing apology.
4.5 Results
Only perceived competence and perceived trustworthiness
were normally distributed. Thus the independent t-test
was performed for these variables and the Mann-Whitney
U test for the not normally distributed variables. The
independent variable in both tests was the condition the
participants were assigned to. To test for an association
between the test groups and the assignment of responsi-
bility the chi-square test was applied.
Manipulation Checks. The manipulation was successful
since all participants correctly answered who was blamed
by Sam. Furthermore, the ratings of the agent’s emotional
reaction after the game imply that the facial expressions
of regret and anger were perceived as intended. In the SB
condition participants rated Sam’s guilt higher (MSB =
4.17, SDSB = .79, MOB = 1.44, SDOB = .98, U = 15.00,
z = −4.90, p < .001, r = −.82), whereas participants in
the OB group rated anger higher (MSB = 2.17, SDSB =
1.10, MOB = 4.00, SDOB = .97, U = 39.00, z = −4.02,
p < .001, r = −.67).
Likeability and Competence. The perceived trustwor-
thiness differed significantly between the two conditions:
Sam was perceived more trustworthy in the SB than in the
OB condition (MSB = 3.81, SDSB = .63, MOB = 2.55,
SDOB = .66, t(34) = 5.83, p < .001, r = .70). There was a
significant relationship between this variable and the over-
all experience, which represented whether the participants
would like to play again with Sam (τ = .34, p < .01).
That suggests that as the ratings of Sam’s trustworthi-
ness increases, how much participants would like to play
again with Sam increases as well. Moreover, ratings of
the overall experience differed significantly between the
two conditions. Subjects in the SB group would much
rather play with Sam again than subjects in the OB group
(MSB = 4.00, SDSB = .97, MOB = 2.33, SDOB = 1.41,
U = 60.00, z = −3.30, p < .01, r = −.55). Another
significant correlation was detected between the overall
experience and the participants’ feeling of camaraderie
(τ = .38, p < .01). Ratings of the agent’s competence did
not differ significantly between the test groups (MSB =
3.12, SDSB = .81, MOB = 2.90, SDOB = .89, t(34) = .78,
ns, r = .13).
Cooperativeness, Responsibility and Trust. Ratings
of the agent’s cooperativeness did not differ significantly
between the test groups (MSB = 3.72, SDSB = 1.02,
MOB = 3.39, SDOB = 1.14, U = 135.00, z = −.89,
ns, r = −.15). Furthermore, no significant association
was found between the conditions and the attribution of
responsibility (χ2(2) = 3.05, ns). Fifty-three percent of all
subjects assigned responsibility to the team (see Figure 5).
Ninety-four percent of the subjects explained their reasons
for assigning responsibility. In the SB condition 80% of
the subjects attributing responsibility to both players
felt a team affiliation and thus blamed themselves and
Sam for the outcome of the game. Only 67% named
the same reason in the OB condition for blaming the
team. Additionally, 22% in the OB condition said that,
while their mistakes were decisive for the failure, Sam’s
comments during the game were demotivating and thereby
had an effect on the outcome as well. Of the other
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Fig. 5. Responsibility attributions (main study).
47%, however, who did not assign responsibility to both
players, 71% agreed with Sam on the attribution of blame
regardless of the test group. However, a tendency could
be seen in the number of coins given to Sam in the GSD.
Subjects in the SB group tended to give more coins to
Sam than subjects in the other group (MSB = 3.47,
SDSB = 1.60, MOB = 2.50, SDOB = 1.30, U = 86.50,
z = −1.80, p < .10, r = −.31).
Emotional Reaction. The evaluation of the subjects’
emotional reaction after the game reveals significant dif-
ferences between the two test groups. While subjects in the
OB condition felt more shame, annoyance, indignation and
relief, subjects in the SB condition felt more camaraderie.
Furthermore, a significant tendency was observed implying
that subjects in the SB condition were happier and felt
less guilt and anger. The feeling of trust did not differ
significantly between the conditions. Table 1 contains the
statistical values for the emotional reaction.
Open Question Comments. Similarities were found be-
tween the answers of the participants to the open questions
at the end of the post-questionnaire. The participants were
asked to describe Sam in their own words. Fifteen percent
observed that the agent said nothing positive during the
interaction and 12% wished to have more communica-
tion in the form of discussing a strategy, getting positive
feedback as well as negative or getting suggestions for
improvement from Sam.
5. DISCUSSION
We have presented an experiment including a virtual agent
that actively attributed blame, either to itself or to a
human team partner, in the context of cooperation. As
it was assumed that any blaming strategy reduces trust,
the self-blaming agent used an external apology in order
to repair trust. The results were in line with findings in
human-robot interaction concerning the higher likeability
of the self-blaming agent (Groom et al., 2010; Kaniarasu
and Steinfeld, 2014), as the self-blaming agent was per-
ceived more trustworthy and the participants would much
rather play with this agent again than with the other
agent. However, in contrast to the results of Groom et al.
(2010), ratings of the agent’s competence did not differ
significantly, which is a positive result for the use of other-
blame.
We observed a tendency to trust the self-blaming agent
more than the agent blaming the human partner. Partici-
pants’ feeling of trust, however, did not differ significantly
between the two test groups. Nevertheless, the correlation
between perceived trustworthiness, whether participants
would like to play again with Sam (overall experience),
and participants’ feeling of camaraderie, might imply that
whenever the agent is perceived more trustworthy, feelings
of camaraderie and the overall experience are positively in-
fluenced. This is a strong indicator for the success of trust
repair. Nevertheless, further investigation of self-blame
with and without a trust-repairing apology is needed to
verify this assumption. So far, it is not clear, if self-blame
lowers trust and the repair was successful or if the blaming
strategy did not have the same negative effects in this
study compared to the experiments with robots by Groom
et al. (2010) and Kaniarasu and Steinfeld (2014). A control
condition with a self-blaming agent that does not try to
repair trust could have confirmed the assumptions.
Moreover, participants’ emotional reactions in the SB
condition were more positive than in the OB condition.
Participants who were blamed by the agent felt more
shame, annoyance, indignation and also relief, but less
camaraderie. Since relief is a positive emotion, it is not
clear how it fits in with the negative emotions those
participants felt more strongly. An explanation could be
that these participants were relieved that the game and
thus the agent’s negative comments were over. Moreover,
a tendency emerged indicating that participants in the OB
condition were angrier, felt more guilt, and were less happy
in comparison. Therefore, it seems that the results are in
line with the findings of the blame experiments conducted
with robots by Groom et al. (2010) and Kaniarasu and
Steinfeld (2014).
Participants remarked that the agent should not only
give negative but also positive feedback and also make
suggestions for improvement in order to keep up the
participants’ motivation. This might also attenuate any
negative effects of blame judgements and especially of
those directed at others. Moreover, users would have liked
to discuss a strategy with the agent prior to a round. This
may improve the cooperative character of the puzzle game.
In contrast to the assumption that other-blame has a
negative effect on the team affiliation, a similar effect
in the assignment of responsibility was observed in the
main study as in the pre-study. Approximately half of the
participants assigned responsibility to the team and 80%
explained this with the feeling of a team affiliation. This
suggests that either the agent’s attribution of blame did
not have any effect, or participants did not think that one
player alone had the capacity to prevent the outcome and
therefore attributed less or even no blame. Participants’
answers to the open questions suggest that they did believe
the agent, but either felt a strong team affiliation with
the self-blaming agent or not only blamed themselves, but
also the demotivating statements of the agent blaming
them. However, as the precise course of the game was
different for every participant, the manipulation of the
agent’s game play might not have been optimal to control
how serious participants perceived the agent’s mistakes.
Minor mistakes might not warrant blame. A suggestion
for further experiments thus is that the agent makes more
serious mistakes at specified times during the game. As
team affiliation seemed to have a strong influence on the
assignment of responsibility in both experiments, it would
be interesting to compare the SB and OB conditions to a
Table 1. Mann-Whitney U test results of the emotional reactions.
Variable MSB SDSB MOB SDOB U z Sig. r
shame 1.72 1.07 2.56 1.29 100.00 -2.08 p < .05 -.35
annoyance 2.11 1.32 3.11 1.32 95.50 -2.20 p < .05 -.37
indignation 1.89 .90 3.06 1.21 76.00 -2.82 p < .01 -.47
relief 1.94 .73 2.67 .91 89.50 -2.42 p < .05 -.40
camaraderie 2.83 1.15 1.72 1.02 75.50 -2.85 p < .01 -.48
happiness 2.67 .97 2.06 .94 104.00 -1.93 p < .10 -.32
guilt 1.94 1.11 2.78 1.44 106.00 -1.88 p < .10 -.31
anger 1.61 .85 2.22 1.11 110.50 -1.74 p < .10 -.29
trust 2.61 1.15 2.06 .94 116.00 -1.51 ns -.25
third in which the agent attributes blame to the team as
it was done in the experiments by Groom et al. (2010) and
Kaniarasu and Steinfeld (2014).
As participants showed a strong tendency to affiliate with
the team in both conditions and ratings of the agent’s
cooperativeness did not differ significantly, both strategies
of blame enable an ongoing interaction. However, blame
directed at the user elicited negative responses as well.
Hence, other-blame should only be used by the agent
if the human team partner is obviously or likely more
culpable. In contrast, self-blame with a trust-repairing
apology is an effective means for addressing problems, as
the cooperation can continue and trust in and likeability
of the agent are high. Trust repair after blame attributions
may also provide a solution to avoid negative responses to
an agent blaming the user.
In conclusion, the results indicate that if blame is at-
tributed correctly, it can be used successfully to address
problems and to help fixing them. Implementing trust
repair after attributions of blame is likely to be the key
for that. Overall, this work has taken a first step in
exploring blame attributions and trust repair in human-
agent cooperation, but further experiments are needed to
fully understand the complex concepts of blame and trust
repair.
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